ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Power loads in modern society have a tendency to complexity and diversity. Certain commercial and industrial equipment, such as computer systems, robots, PLC and compressors, is so sensitive to power quality (PQ) that even several cycles' interruptions or voltage sags would bring about large losses in economy. Traditional PQ regulating methods in electricity distribution systems have displayed several drawbacks. For instance, the methods cannot guarantee the power quality accepted by consumers, or make compensations for PQ accidents rational, or give a transparent price to quality power, or decide a reasonable risk allocation of disturbances, or provide incentives for PQ improvement. Additionally, the regulatory structure offers no contribution to the utility's making of investment decisions. Neither can the structure satisfy the increasing requirements for premium power. Due to the restructuring of electricity industry, electric energy is transacted on the market like common commodities. Consequently, PQ, as one of the attributes of the product traded between electricity utilities and customers, plays an important role in the survival in the competition. Such requests as supplying multi-quality electric energy, setting prices of electric energy by its quality and providing rational compensation for PQ accidents become users' urgent ones, which have been attracting scholars both at home and abroad all the time. References [1] - [2] discuss economic assessment on PQ, and reference [3] emphasizes pricing for electric energy considering PQ. On the whole, research on pricing for electric energy with multi-quality is still in the early stage with a lot of work to complete. This paper presents a method that introduces the concept of quality insurance to pricing for electric energy with multi-quality. Reference [4] researches on supplying electric energy with different reliability based on "reliability insurance" method. And [5] applies "provider insurance" method, and introduces reasonable insurance policy into reserve power service. Both the two papers offer helpful reference for supplying electric energy with multi-quality and electric energy pricing by quality through quality insurance method.
SUMMARY OF QUALITY INSURANCE METHOD

Basic Imagination
In order to actualize electric energy supply with multiquality, electric utilities and electric consumers should reach a special power-consuming contract with pricing by quality, which is equal to signing a quality insurance contract. Besides such traditional terms as supply address and method, load capacity, electric energy measurement, electricity price and dispute settling method, the new contract is supposed to give a detailed and unambiguous illustration of PQ level and relevant compensation for PQ violations. Firstly, the rational pricing mechanism, according to the belief of pricing by quality, should reflect the principle that the higher the quality, the higher the price. Electricity price comprises the price of basic electric energy and quality insurance premium as following:
where p means the electricity price for the energy at the expected quality grade, p b is the unit price of basic electric energy, and p ij represents unit insurance premium concerning PQ index j in grade i. For any customer, the chosen PQ indice allows for varying in terms of grade, and diferent customers are permitted to buy diferent amount of p ij . The higher users demand in quality, the higher insurance premium should be paid, and the higher the electricity price will be. This phenomenon doesnot contrast with the principle of high quality with high price. Secondly, in order to realize rational compensation for PQ accidents, the compensation provided by electric utilities should be equal to the users' economic losses caused by the Because customers know their economic losses more exactly, unit prices of compensation should be chosen by themselves. In case of an unreasonably high unit price, the chosen R should be in direct proportion to insurance unit price p as following: R=K⋅p (2) If customers want to get higher compensation, they need to buy higher insurance premium ahead. And compensation proportion coefficient K should meet following terms. Compared to the electric energy supply without multiquality, users' expenditure will not increase while receiving basic electric energy service. Such kind of quality insurance method is likely to be comfortably taken by the customers. So electricity providers are required to make promises for all the PQ indices in different grades. Then users can make economic assessment for buying quality insurance. Two qualitative parameters are further introduced as numerical criteria to assure steady-and transient-state indices of basic electric energy: Maximal Unqualified Rate (MUR) and Maximal Violation Times (MVT). For example, when it is laid out in the contract that the total time of basic electric energy with RSM value less than 0.9pu must take up less than 15% of a day, the relevant MUR 0.9 against RMS<0.9pu is 0.15. When the electricity quantity with RMS<0.95pu is promised less than 25% each day, the MUR 0.95 against RMS<0.95pu is 0.25. When the times of sags with residual voltage (RV) lower than 0.7pu are promised to be less than 20 in a day, the MVT 0.7 against sag RV<0.7pu is 20. When the times of sags with RV<0.8pu are promised to be less than 30 every day, the corresponding MVT 0.8 against sag RV<0.8pu is 30. Let MUR and MVT be the reciprocals of K for steady-and transient-state indices respectively, the relationship between p and R are given as
where the units of p and R are both USD/MWh. Equation (3) accords with steady-state indices and (4) accords with the transient-state ones. Suppose a user has bought unit insurance p sj according to index j in grade s, and the daily electricity quantity is T d . Then, according to equations (3) and (4), his daily insurance expenditure Pay j for index j is:
If the electric utility only provides the basic energy service, it must pay the compensation Com j as the result of its violating electric energy whose quantity is MUR sj ⋅T d (or MVT sj ⋅(T d /72)), described as following:
(8) Obviously, to both steady-and transient-state indices, there exists the relation Pay j =Com j . The relation indicates if the electric utility only provides the basic energy service, all the insurance expenditure paid by the consumers will be paid back as compensation. On the other hand, the term in the contract that the users' expenditure will not increase while accepting basic electric energy service is also satisfied. If the provided PQ level is higher than that of the basic energy, some of the insurance expenditure will not be paid back to the customers. This has reflected principle of high price for high quality, and indicates that electric utility only bears the compensation responsibility for those PQ accidents lower than the bottom lines in the basic electric energy promises. Meanwhile, for those PQ accidents within the basic electric energy promises, whether they should be mitigated lies on whether user's insurance premium can balance the mitigation expenses. In order to prevent electric utilities from escaping compensation responsibility, PQ Supervision Department (PQSD), with referring to the statistical records before putting the quality insurance method into practice, should prescribe the bottom PQ promises for the utilities. In addition, abundant competition in supply side may effectively alleviate the possibility of that kind of speculation behaviors in electric utilities. Because they will be discarded by millions of users if they run the risk of dampening the PQ promises concerning the basic electric energy.
Advantage of Quality Insurance Method
Generally, PQ always fluctuates more or less. Higher PQ with less compensation while lower PQ with more, electric energy pricing by quality based on quality insurance method reflects the principle of high quality with high price, and it can assure that users' expenditure will not increase while accepting the basic electric energy service. In order to minimize the sum of PQ-improvement expenses and compensation for PQ accidents, electric utilities will adjust their PQ according to insurance bought by customers. If customers want to relieve economic risk caused by PQ fluctuations completely, they can buy suitable unit insurance p. Therefore, the compensation can balance the losses. So this pricing method can compensate for PQ accidents rationally, and can reflect users' PQ demands, and can make the customers clearer of the value of PQ, and can direct electric utilities' investment decisions to more efficient usages as well. Finally, this pricing method can improve the social comprehensive benefits to a great extent.
Based on quality insurance method, users can pay different quality insurance premium for different indices in different quality grades. In other words, they choose different compensation level. Electric utilities will seek most Power-consuming contracts reveal PQ demands on user sides. PQ varies with consumers' preferences, so the burden to determine the most efficient level of the quality for the system is removed from the regulators.
Additional Remarks on the Quality Insurance Method
In order to prevent electric utilities from suffering economic losses or bankrupt from quality insurance, relevant regulations on the users in the quality insurance contract must be made clear. Firstly, characteristics and the maximum polluting current (including harmonic, unbalanced current, surge current, irregular and flicker current and reactive power current) of users' load should be described unambiguously. Those PQ accidents caused by users' irresponsibility will not be compensated, because the PQ investment decision is made according to information described in insurance contract. Secondly, in order to parry speculation behaviors of the insurance users, the validity period of the contract should be long enough. Otherwise, some users may choose very high quality level at the beginning, and then switch to a lower insurance level after electric utilities have made great PQ investment. Consequently, the electric utilities may lose confidence on PQ investment. So the long-term contract of insurance positively guarantees that the quality level will be elevated continuously and cannot be lowered at will, which will contribute to preventing this kind of speculation behaviors. Thus, electric utilities can extract correct economic signal of PQ investment from the PQ insurance contracts.
Moreover, some PQ accidents are brought about by weather or some other natural disasters from which electric utilities may suffer enormous economic losses. These irresistible accidents can be stipulated beyond the insurance coverage (leaving these risks for users) or be offset via reinsurance.
The implementation of the quality insurance method prerequisites rational price lists of basic electric energy, which is not required in the traditional electricity supply. The price of basic electric energy supply should produce rational profits for electric utilities, and the price after superposing quality insurance premium can offer proper fund for compensation and PQ improvement.
After a period of PQ investment, electric utilities has been strengthened in PQ management; the bottommost promises of basic electric energy quality can be heightened properly. So users can share benefit created by quality insurance system with the whole society. But this needs longer time (at least 5 years), during which electric utilities can make correct investment decisions.
EXAMPLES Analysis From User's Side
Daily electric consumption of a certain paper mill is T d =240MWh, the connect voltage is 35kV, and the price of electricity is 50USD/MWh. So its daily electricity rate is: 240×50=1.2×10 4 USD.
The papermaking equipments are sensitive to harmonic voltage and voltage sags. The current national standard "Harmonics in Public Grid" (GB/T14549-1993) restricts that total harmonic distortion (THD) in 35kV voltage can't exceed 3%, while there is no national standard to restrain voltage sag yet. But electric energy with THD>2% will make paper production trashy, and the economic loss v THD is about 1000USD/MWh. Average economic loss v sag caused by sags with RV<0.8pu is 100USD/time. Inspected at connect point, electric energy with THD>2% takes up 12.5%, and the percentage of THD>3% is 8.3%. Voltage sags with RV<0.8pu happen to 20 times every day averagely. Without quality insurance, according to "power supply business rules": when power factor satisfies standards, but power voltage oversteps standard, electric utility should compensate for user's losses. The compensation is 20% product of electricity quantity that is unqualified for voltage and average electricity price in this month of user. Without national standard restricting voltage sags, paper mill can only gain compensation of the electric energy with THD>3%. Economic losses caused by PQ accidents and compensation paper mill can gain are shown in Table 1 .
Data in Table 1 indicates that current unified PQ standards cannot satisfy the special request of this paper mill. Ordinary electric energy supply will make it suffer serious economic loss that is 2.67 times of total electricity rate; while compensation offered by electric utility only is 0.625% of its economic loss. Present compensation method cannot reflect PQ actual value to the paper mill, and cannot 
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Equation (13) indicates if the compensation price bought by paper mill satisfies R RV≥0.8pu =72v sag /T d =30USD/MWh, same to p RV≥0.8pu =30×20/72=8.3USD/MWh, then this paper mill will not suffer extra economic losses because of voltage sags with RV<0.8pu rising. That risk has all been shifted to electric utility. Table 2 lists the PQ indices parameters of basic electric energy supplied by a certain electric utility. While electric utility supplies power with diverse THD, Table 3 summarizes actual electricity rate (ER), PQ accident losses (PQAL) and total both-inclusive costs (TC), when this mill buys different insurance prices corresponding to THD<2% separately. Similarly, Table 4 summarizes those data for voltage sags. Data in Table 3 and 4 indicates, based on quality insurance method, this paper mill pays electricity rate according to actual quality of electric energy, that reflects the principle of high quality with high price. As the consumer chooses R=v (unit compensation price of steady state indices) and R=72v/T d (unit compensation price of transient state indices), TC that contains PR and PQAL is constant. That indicates that economic benefits of this mill will not be influenced by PQ fluctuations. On the contrary, if the user chooses other insurance prices, although they have a chance to make additional profit, but the risk of suffering economic losses will be taken at the same time. Furthermore, electric utilities will adjust their supplying PQ according to the insurance premium that the users have paid, so the users' chance to make profit is very slim. This example demonstrates three points. Firstly, the electric energy pricing mechanism based on quality insurance method has realized pricing by quality. Secondly, as long as users buy suitable quality insurance price, they can be free of the risk of economic losses caused by PQ fluctuations. Fortunately, the risk can be shifted to electric utilities. Finally, the quality insurance method reveals actual PQ value in distribution systems, and creates incentives for electric utilities to keep PQ at ligh levels and to make correct decision on PQ investment according to users' demands.
Analysis from Electric Utility Side
Profits that electric utility can gain from the PQ-service can be expressed as: profit=insurance premium−compensation−PQ investment For example, the profit gained from the insurance service for a certain steady state index at a certain level can be expressed as:
The profit gained from the insurance service of a certain transient state index in a certain level can be given as:
where n means user's serial number, both TZ j1 and TZ j2 mean PQ investment corresponding to index j1 and j2 respectively. In (14) and (15), as the insurance premium is chosen by users themselves, the only way for electric utility to increase profit is to reduce the sum of compensation and unnecessary PQ investment. Suppose the PQ investment is zero, PQ will be maintained as that of basic electric energy. Data in Tables 3 and 4 indicates that insurance premium received is totally equal to the compensation. Electric utility doesn't obtain any profit because nothing has been done. For instance, electricity users have various options for the insurance prices to assure THD less than 2%, and electric utility maintains AUR=MUR=12.5% steadily:
Electric utilities, whose investment must be compared with the reduced difference of compensation, should figure out to what extent the viability of improving some users' PQ is. For example, the paper mill buys insurance premium that satisfies R=v=1000USD/MWh to assure THD<2% as above mentioned. If PQ is kept as that of the basic electric energy, the daily compensation Com 1 that should be paid by electric utility is:
6 USD is invested, the percentage of electric utility with THD>2% can be reduced to10% from 12.5%, and the daily compensation Com 2 that should be paid becomes:
Com 2 =1000×240×0.1=24000USD (18) Consequently, in less than three years, that PQ investment will have been all regained. Investors are more likely to favor such investment. After the cost of investment is regained, electric utilities can properly improve bottommost promises of basic electric energy. Therefore, users can share benefit created by the quality insurance method. This example demonstrates that quality insurance method sends clear economic signals of PQ to electric utilities and directs the investment to where it is most needed. Electric utilities can enlarge their profit through correctly handling economic risks and individualized power supplies. As economic risks caused by PQ fluctuations are shifted to electric utilities, they will have to emphasize PQ problems in power distribution and improve the efficiency of PQ investment. If so, the benefits will touch every corner of the society. Users make clear the actual value of PQ in distribution systems through their choices of insurance premium, from which both users and electric utilities will enjoy material benefits.
CONCLUSIONS
Compared to traditional single standard PQ managing methods, the quality insurance method presented in the paper highlights several advantages. Though the bottommost PQ promises (MUR and MVT) of the basic electric energy prescribed by PQSD may include some error, yet much of the disadvantages of traditional PQ managing methods can be effectively overcome. The quality insurance method can promote electric energy supply with multi-quality in electricity market. It realizes pricing by quality. Users' choices to quality insurance price can display the actual value of PQ. So, any quality accidents can be rationally compensated. Economic risks, therefore, are shifted from users who have lower PQcontrol capability than electric utilities, which provides momentum for electric utilities to protect PQ for users and offers suitable PQ-service according to users' actual needs. This method can guide rational PQ investment decision making. PQ is chosen by users, so the burden for the supervisors of PQ is removed, and the chance of error is reduced greatly. Examples of user and electric utility prove the feasibility and effectiveness of this method. PQ-service is unbundled from basic electric energy service by quality insurance. So users can compare this method with that in other ways when they are to make decisions, such as installing STATCOM by themselves. Quality insurance realizes electric energy supply with multi-quality that make users can use electric energy with acceptable PQ and users only have to pay the necessary expenses corresponding to their quality requirements.
